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THE HISTORY OF OIL AND
GAS CONSERVATION
LEGISLATION IN
ARKANSAS

Phillip Norvell

The History of Oil and Gas Conservation Legislation in Arkansas
I. Introduction

2014 is the 75th anniversary of the enactment of the Arkansas Conservation
Act, Act I 05 of 1939, that imposed a scheme of state regulation on oil and gas
prod uction to avoid waste and protect correlative rights. The Act created the
Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission to administer and enforce the regulatory
scheme. The purpose of this art icle is to provide a narrati ve of the history of the
enactment of Act 105 of 1939. The background of the Act, the Rule of Captu re
and the prodigious economic and physical waste that it yielded will be examined,
along with early conservation attempts in the prod uci ng states to stem the vast tide
of waste. The early Arkansas experience with waste and the ineffectual legislation
attempts to solve the matter will be explored, including the pi votal events in the
Rodessa and Shuler fields that were the catalysis for the enactment of Act I 05.
An analysis of the major substanti ve provisions of Act 105 will be unde1iaken,
incl udi ng the shortcomi ngs of the i nitial Act and the subsequent legislati ve
amendments that forged the Act into an effective comprehensi ve scheme of state
regulation that conserves valuable oil and gas resources.
II. The Common Law Background of Unregulated Production
a. The Rule of Capture
Oil and gas in its natural state, unlike hard minerals, is a fluid or vapor. It is
fugacious and wi ll migrate across bou ndary lines withi n the subsurface reservoi r.
It is susceptibl e to drainage from off-tract wells. The migratory character of oil
and gas has proved to be its defining physical characteristic. It led to the
venerable rule of capture 1 which permitted landowners the unrestricted right to
drill and produce from wells located on-tract without incurri ng liability for off
tract drainage. An early oil and gas practitioner and commentator on the oil and
gas conservation movement summed up the rule as "the owner of a tract of land
acquires title to the oil and gas which he prod uces from wells drilled thereon,
though it may proved that part of such oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands."2
The remed y for the hapless landowner being drained by his adjoining neighbor's
I

well was "Go and do thou likewise" 3 , i .e., dri ll an offset protection well, the "evil
twin" of the ru le of captu re.
The adoption of the rule of capture for oil and gas was premised on the lack
of scientific knowledge of the behavior of produci ng reservoi rs that existed
during the embryonic days of the industry. 4 It was known that oil and gas wou ld
migrate across surface bou ndary lines when produced but the technology did not
exist to ascertain the source of the prod uction within the reservoir. Consequentl y,
early courts analogized to the common l aw of percol ating waters (grou ndwater)
and the law of obtaini ng possession to wild animals, both of which applied the
rule of capture. Regardless of whether the analogi es to percolati ng waters or wild
animals were appropriate or not, applyi ng the rule of capture to oil and gas
production occasioned much waste of oil and gas development costs and reserves.
The early proponents of oil and gas conservation legislation bel ieved the judicial
adoption of the rule of capture to be an exercise in ignorance. 5 Professor Maurice
Merri ll, an early oil and gas scholar, wri ting in the early l 960's, observed that a
state court adopti ng the rule of capture did about as well as could be expected due
to the then state of the knowledge as to reservoir mechanics. 6 Despi te the evils
associated with the rule of captu re, it was not without its virtue. The modern
justification for the rule is that it rewards those who exercise diligence and take
the risk in drilling oil and gas wells. 7 The rule encourages development of oil and
gas reserves.
b. Waste
The rule of capture as the cornerstone of unregulated production
occasioned much mischief. Because oil and gas is prod uced from subsurface
reservoi rs which may, and frequently do, u nderlay nu merous separatel y owned
tracts, the rule of capture simply mandated the classic "common pool
exploitation" 8 of the reservoir in which each tract owner, to ensure its maximum
recovery from the reservoi r, was encouraged to drill as many wells and prod uce as
much oil and gas from the "common pool," as fast as possi ble. The consequences
of the rule of capture was enormous physical waste includi ng both surface and
undergrou nd, as well as economic waste. 9
Surface waste invol ves loss of oil at the surface resul ting from spillage,
evaporation and overflows from ea1ihen surface storage pits or open oil tanks and
leaks from production and transportation equipment. Land was also wasted as
numerous wells meant excessive surface usage for drilling, prod uci ng operations
2

and transportation of the prod uction. Economic waste was also rampant in that
unnecessary investment was expended in the dri lling and operation of needless
wells. For example, in 1965 the East Texas field had an estimated 17,200 wells
and one expert opined that it could have been efficiently and effectively drained
by 1500 wells. 1 0
The rule of captu re also led to undergrou nd waste. Undergrou nd waste
occurs when oil and gas in the reservoi r that could have been produced will be left
behi nd because of wasteful and inefficient operation of the well or wells.
Production that impai rs the reservoirs natural energy mechanism that facilitates
efficient recovery is one source of u nderground waste. Oil and gas reservoi rs are
distinctly unique as to the reservoi r pressure mechanism that effectuates
prod uction. 1 1 Gas-cap drives, dissolved-gas drives, water-drives and any
combinations of the three may characterize oi l and gas reservoirs. In a gas-cap
drive reservoir, the gas, which is lighter than oil, is on top of the oil zone. As the
oil is prod uced, the gas expands to displace the oil and increases the reservoir
pressure to drive the oil to the well bore and assists in the l i ft to the surface. In a
dissolved-gas reservoi r the gas is dissolved in the oil and as the oil is produced the
dissolved gas in the oil expands to increase the reservoi r pressure and likewise
facilitate prod uction. In a water -drive reservoi r, which are known for their
potential for high rates of ul timate recovery from the reservoir, the oil is top of the
water and as the oil is produced, the water expands and enhances the reservoi r
pressure and facil itates production.
Oil wells that produce high ratios of gas to oil in gas drive reservoi rs or high
ratios of water to oil in water drive reservoi rs may u nduly dissipate the reservoi r
pressure and thei r production should be limited if not restrai ned. A uniform rate
of production is necessary to avoid wasted reservoir energy, and irregular and non
u niform migration of flu ids that may by-pass large deposi ts of oil or gas that wi ll
be left behind in the reservoir and may result in premature abandonment of the
field. The oil-water contact line or the gas-oil contact line needs to move
u niforml y through out the reservoi r as the oil is prod uced to avoid "channeling"
or "coning" that traps or by-passes oil or gas in the reservoi r that may never be
recovered.
Underground waste, like surface and economic waste, was ram pant under
u nregulated prod uction and the rule of capture. 1 2 Excessive number of wells
draini ng the reservoi r without regard to either the oil/gas ratios or oil/water ratios,
characterized production in the early years of the 20th century. Wide open flow of
3

wells, the practice of the early operators whose vocabu l ary did not contain the
word "choke", exacerbated the problem. Likewise, the practice of venti ng or
flaring the gas was monstrousl y wasteful of oil and gas reserves. In the early days
of the industry, there was no market for gas and it was viewed as a worthless by
product of oil production. More over, a general belief existed that i f a well
initiall y prod uced only gas, the well had to be "blown out", to deplete the gas in
the reservoir before the well would prod uce oil. 1 3 Tremendous physical waste,
much of it u ndergrou nd, was experienced.
The perils of u nderground waste were not early known. Unli ke surface
spills or evaporation of oil from surface pits, u nderground waste couldn 't be
observed. Bottom hole pressure tests that could lead to the obvious conclusion
that declining prod uction was related to declini ng pressure only became prevalent
in the late l 920's. Petroleum engineeri ng, the science of reservoi r performance,
was in a nascent state of development. However, an awareness of reservoir
characteristics and behavior and prudent management to avoid physical and
economic waste was developi ng.

c. The Doctrine of Correlative Rights
The common law doctrine of correlative rights 14 developed parallel with the
evolution of the science of underground waste. The doctrine is premised on the
recognition that mineral owners to tracts that overly the reservoi r share "reciprocal
rights and duties in the common source of supply." 1 5 Each landowner has the right
to prod uce his fair share of the common source of supply and the duty not to
negligently or intentionall y injure the common source of supply. Negligent 16 or
intentional 1 7 spoilation of the common source of supply incurs liability. Likewise,
the defendant 's surreptitious production in excess of his well allowable established
by the conservation agency's Proration Order that resulted in drainage from the plaintiff
s adjacent production unit incurred liability for breach of the correlative rights doctrine. 1
8

Described as an exception to the non-lia bility for drainage feature of the rule of
capture, 19 the correlative rights doctrine is based on the necessity of maintaining and
utilizing reservoir pressure to obtain maximum ultimate recovery from the common
source of supply. The doctrine is a recogni tion that the landowner's property interest is
not merely in the oil and gas in that portion of the common source of supply that
underlies his tract but extends to the right to "make use of the expulsive forces which
constitute the reservoir energy."20 The reservoir energy, like the oil and gas, constitute a
4

common source of suppl y.21 Stated another way, the oil and gas and the reservoir energy
are a "package" that comprise the landowner's property interest in the oil and gas estate.
The emergence and acceptance of the doctrine of correlative rights pmiended that
comprehensive oil and gas conservation acts, when adopted, would serve dual purposes:
the prevention of waste and the protection of correlative rights. These two objectives, it
has been observed, are "coequals, each worthy of pursuit in its own right, one for the sake
of what may be called economy , the other for the sake of equity."22 Others, however,
have opined that in the event of a conflict between the prevention of waste and protection
of prope1ty rights under the correlative rights doctrine under conservation acts, the
former prevails. 23
III. The Early Conservation Acts
The depressed price for crude oil was the paramount problem of the industry
during the era of unregulated production and the rule of capture. The race to drill as
many wells and produce as much oil as possible yielded production in excess of the
demand for oil and the transpmiation facilities in the field. Precipitous declines in the
price of crude were experienced. The goal of the industry was state control of production
so that the problem of surplus capacity could be eliminated. The rule of capture was the
target for reform under the guise of conservation, including the prevention of economic
and physical waste, but the pri mary objective was market stabilization.2 4 Though it was
inevita ble that the attempt to limit the supply of crude, and raise its price, as an objective
of conservation, would prove controversial, the effect of the relationship of "distressed
crude oil" to physical waste was real:
"The inevitable result of the rule of capture's complete lack of legal restraint
has been to force producers into one drilling race after another, in which
each sought to drill as many wells as possible, as quickly as possible, in
order to capture for himself the lion's share of the spoils. Nearly every
discovery of an impo1iant oil field brought a mad rush of drilling that often
produced more oil than the market could absorb. Whenever this occurred,
the unhappy operator who could not find a buyer for his oil neve1iheless
continued to produce his wells rather than have his more fo1iunate
neighbors drain oil from his lands. In field after field, wi th no other
facilities available, this surplus oil was "stored" in pits dug out of raw earth,
and even in open ditches; appalling quantities of oil were lost through
evaporation and seepage, surface and underground waters were polluted, and
serious fire hazards created, sometimes with disastrous results." 25

5

a. Prorationing
Prorationing is the obvious remedy for dea ling with the problem of "distressed
oil." In market demand prorationing, the state conservation agency restricts statewide
production to the estimated market demand and then allocates the state total back to either
fields or reservoi rs and then to individual wells. 26 Thus, each prod ucing well is assigned
an "allowable." The intended effect is to accumulatively reduce the state's production to
equa l the market demand. The first proration statute was a market demand statute and
was enacted in Oklahoma in 1915 after discovery of the huge Healdton and Cushing
fields whose production glutted an already saturated market with oil far in excess of
market demand. 27 The Act defi ned waste to include "production in excess of marketing
or transpo1iation facilities or reasonable market demand"28 and authorized the
Corporation Commission to prorate production from any common source of supply to
avoid such waste. 29 Texas passed a similar market demand proration statute in 1919.30
Prorationing can also operate to limit the production from wells in the reservoir to
a rate of production that avoids physical waste without out regard to the market for the
production. Rapid and indiscriminate rates of production may dissipate reservoir pressure
and cause underground waste of oil reserves. Parallel with the development of the theory
of underground waste was the theory of the Maximum Efficient Rate of production
(MER) that maintains reservoir pressure and yields ultimate maximum recovery of oil.
The MER has been defined as the as the "highest sustaina ble rate at which a field can be
produced for a designated period without apprecia ble loss in ultimate oil recovery." 31
MER likely does not entail one rate of production that will yield maximum ultimate
recovery but a range of production rates that attain efficient operation and maximum
recovery over the life of the well. 32
Market demand proration and MER prorationing could have been jointly
administered in a state's prorationing scheme. Under such a scheme, an allowa ble under
market demand prorationing for a well could not be greater than the allowa ble for that
well under MER prorationi ng. An allowable in excess of the MER allowable would
permit an inefficient rate of production that may cause underground waste. If the market
demand allowa ble is below the MER allowable, than the market demand allowable is
operative. However, joint administration of MER and market demand prorationing may
not have been the general practice. 33
Despite its controversy, market demand prorationing continued until the early
l 970's when the market changed and the demand for oil eclipsed the market supply of oil.
Today, market demand prorationing is only of historical interest. However, some states
still maintain the statutory framework that would permit implementation of market
demand prorationing when supply exceeds demand.

6

b. Ratable Taking
Market demand or MER prorationing may result in physical waste unless oil is
purchased ratably from each well prod ucing in the common source of supply. Ratable
taking requires each purchaser to spread out the amount of its purchase from the reservoir
equally between each producing wel l. Otherwise, some wells in the reservoir may
produce more, while other wells produce less, or none, resulting in an imbalance in
production within the reservoir that may create an non-uni form oil-water or gas-oil
contact line and trap or by-pass oil that may be left behi nd. Additionally, in the absence
of ratable taking, the producing tracts may drain the non-producing tracts in violation of
the doctrine of correlative rights. The statutory remedy was typically a rata ble take
statute, sometimes referred to as a common purchaser statute, that required a purchaser to
take rata bl y from all wells in the field. Oklahoma enacted the first rata ble take statute,
applying only to gas, in 1913 .34

c. Well Spacing Acts
Well spacing acts were also central to the control of production and the abatement
of the enormous economic and physical waste that followed the rule of capture. Such
acts limit the number and location of wells that can be drilled in a reservoir to elimi nate
unnecessary wells and their cumulative excessive rates of production. Relying on its
general statutory authority to make rules and regulations to prevent waste of oil and gas,
the Texas Railroad Commission (TRC) promulgated Rule 37, the Texas well spacing
regulation, was promulgated in 1919.35 Rule 37 simply prohi bited the drilling of a well
nearer than 300' to any other wells or nearer than 150' to any prope1ty line. This basically
established a spacing pattern that prohibited drilling on a tract of less than two (2) acres.
However, exception wells were expressly permitted to prevent waste and protect
correlative rights. Rule 37 was much amended as the spacing patterns were enlarged.

d. Forced Integration (Compulsory Pooling)
Pooling is complementary to the establishment and operation of spacing or drilling
units under well-spaci ng Acts. Because the area encompassed by the drilling unit is
limited to one ( I ) well for the common source of supply, some legal mechanism is needed
to merge or pool the separately owned tracts situated within the unit so that they
constitute one ( I ) tract for well-spacing purposes. Voluntary pooling achieves that resul t.
Oil and gas leases typically contain pooling clauses 36 that expressly permit the lessee to
pool the tract with other tracts for purposes of satisfying the well-spacing requirements.
Thus, the lessees and any unieased mineral owners of the separately owned tracts
situated in the dri lling unit may agree on a plan of development for the drilling and
operation of the unit well and voluntarily pool their interests. Voluntary pooling has the
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legal effect of integrating the separatel y owned tracts within the drilli ng unit so that they
are treated as one tract for purposes of oil and gas development. Consequently,
production from a well anywhere on the unit satisfies the habendum clause's secondary
term requirement of production, regardless of the location of the unit wel l.37 Likewise,
voluntary pooling appo1iions royalty on a surface-acreage basis. 38
Forced integration is necessary to permit development of a drilling unit when the
working interest owners and unleased mineral owners fail to agree to the plan of
development and voluntary pooling. Courts refused to judicially effectuate pooling, known
as "equitable pooling," to permit the developing paiiy in the drilling unit to drill a unit well
when non-consenting working interest owners refused to voluntarily pool. 19 Thus,
development of the drilling unit could be thwarted by non-consenting unit interests in the
absence of state compulsion provided by forced integration. Forced integration statutes
typically have the legal effect of integrating the separatel y owned tracts withi n the drilling
unit so that they are treated as one tract for purposes of oil and gas development. Likewise,
conservation acts typically mandates that prod uction from a well anywhere on the unit
satisfies the habendum clause's secondary term requirement of production 40 and also
appo1iion royalty on a surface-acreage basis.41

e. U nitization
Unitization of oil and gas reservoirs involves integrating or unitizing the common
source of supply to permit its development and operation as a single unit. 42 Unitization
involves the process of conve1iing the leasehold and mineral interest in each individual
tract or production unit into an interest in the unitized area that permits operations without
regard to the surface prope1iy lines. The geologic characteristics of the reservoir and
pri nciples of reservoir engineering determine the optimum number and location of wells,
the MER rate of production, and avoidance of wells yieldi ng higher than optimal ratios of
gas or water to oil.
In the early I 920's, Henry L. Doherty,4 3 the CEO of Cities Service Oil Co.,
championed a federal statute to compel unitization for the development and operation of
all oi l and gas reservoirs. In the midst of prodigious waste of oil and gas reserves,
Doheiiy believed that the crude oil producers would never abandon unregulated
production or that the producing states would adopt effecti ve conservation laws. Under
D0he1iy's plan, federal fieldwide unitization would obviate the need for well-spacing,
prorationing and ratable take statutes. The industry's attitude was that "there was no evil
then known which was so great as to justify federal control or regulation" 44 of oil and gas
production. Though D0he1iy was a prominent voice for reform, he proved to be no
prophet for federal unitization.
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Unitization can be accomplished by volunta ry unitization or compulsory
unitization pursuant to state conservation acts. Voluntary unitization involves the
agreement of the working interests and mineral interests in all or a part of the reservoir to
undertake joint operations to develop the unit or engage in an enhanced recovery
operation. 45 Unitization invol ves a plan of development or enhanced recovery that will
entail an analysis of the engineering and economics for the proposed project. If the plan
of operation is proposed, a tract participation formula is developed that will allocate the
production as well as the costs for the unit. Unlike pooling which allocates production
and cost for the pooled uni t on a surface acreage basis, unitization allocates production
and costs for the separately owned tracts or production units on their potential for oil
productivity from the unit. Thus, the unit participation formula for each tract may be
based on a combination of factors, such as tract acreage, net acre feet of pay and volume
of oil in place, differences in porosity in the field, current and cumulative production and
projection of recovery from each well. 46 Forming a unitization project is a lengthy and
involved process.
Unitization in the early days was a hard sell. 47 Some working interest or mi neral
owners won 't like the paiiicipation formula. Some believe they would fare better on their
own independent leasehold operation. Fears of excessive costs of unit operations may
exist. Duri ng the l 940's, oil and gas producers lacked experience in evaluating a unit
interest in exchange for an interest in a wholly owned Iease. 48 Compulsory unitization is
required, or should be required, as a remedy for the minority non-consenting interests
whose refusal to execute the unitization agreement impedes voluntary unitization.
Louisianan is reputed to have adopted the first compulsory unitization statute but it was
limited to gas recycli ng operations. Oklahoma's original compulsory unitization statute49
was enacted in I 945.
(4) The 1930's: Distressed Oil and the Interstate Oil Compact
The discovery of the Oklahoma City field and the East Texas field in the early
l 930's flooded an already depressed market with distressed crude. 50 The price of crude
oil fell to IO cents a barrel. The price of Arkansas crude fell to I O cents a barrel in 1933.
In 1930-31 , the state national guard was called out in both Texas and Oklahoma to close
the Oklahoma City and East Texas fields to prevent fu1iher physical waste of oil and gas.
The problem was so severe that oil and gas producing states began to consider an
interstate compact that would authorize collective state action to deal with the problems
of waste and excess market demand. Avoiding legislation by congress that would impose
federal regulation of oil and gas conservation was the impetus for the formation of the
Interstate Oil Compact (]QC).
The driving force for the creation of the Interstate Oil Compact (IOC) was to
establish a compulsory system of state market demand proration to stabilize the price of
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oil. Ultimately, the creation of an IOC as a supra-governmental entity that could compel
states to enact and enforce particular oil and gas conservation schemes failed. The IOC
was approved by Congress in 1935 and operates solely in an education and advisory
capacity that accumulates information on oil and gas conservation, assists member states
in enacting sound oil and gas conservation laws and educates the public on the
importance of the conservation of oil and gas resources. The Interstate Oil Compact
Commission (IOCC), the governing body of the IOC, was most successful in
disseminating the theory of physical and economic waste resulting from un regulated
production and encouraging the prorationing and well-spacing. The arrival of the IOCC
on the scene with its educational mission for oil and gas conservation signifies that
knowledge of the science of oil and gas reservoirs and prudent reservoir management to
avoid underground waste was well-known.
Consequently, the l 930's were the era of the impo1iant oil and gas conservation
acts. Oklahoma adopted a comprehensive conservation act in 1933, Louisiana and New
Mexico adopted conservation acts 1935. Admittedly, comprehensive state conservation
acts that dealt adequately with waste of valua ble natural resources were late in coming.
As early as 1925, the industry had generally known that their time honored methods of
production were inefficient. 5 1 Ignorance of the prodigious underground waste that
occurred from premature dissipation of the reservoir pressure had long cease to be an
excuse for inefficient production practices. Unwillingness to submit to governmental
regulation and resistance to change proved to be difficult obstacles to overcome in the
battle for adequate comprehensive conservation regulation. As noted by Robe1i E.
Hardwicke, one of the early pioneers of oil and gas conservation observed:
Undoubtedly, the great majority of oi l men of that time were skeptical as to
the advisability of abandoning long and established view points and
practices (drill and produce according to your own ideas of efficiency and
economics; drain oil from neighbori ng lands and protect your own land
against adverse drainage as best you can).52
Additionally, the period ushered in a system of market demand proration that
lasted until the early l 970's when domestic supply changed from supply in excess of
demand to demand in excess of supply. At that time, market demand proration dropped
out of the system and MER prorationing reigned supreme.

IO

IV. Waste and Conservation Legislation in Arkansas
a. Physical Waste in Arkansas
The rnle of capture was not benign in Arkansas. The history of oil and gas
production in the State is replete with examples of excessive well density, undue surface
waste and physical waste of oil and gas. W. Henry Rector, author of a tract on the history
of Arkansas' early Oil and Gas Conservation laws,53 summed up the waste of oil and gas
that occurred in the El Dorado and Smackover fields, discovered in 1921 and 1922,
respectively:
"The manner in which the El Dorado and Smackover fields were operated is
a disgrace to the industry. Millions of barrels of oil were allowed to escape,
polluting the waters of Smackover Creek and thereafter the Ouachita River.
The conservation of gas produced with the oil was unheard of, billions of
cubic feet being allowed to go to waste. The excuse was that the wells were
oil wells; that the gas was merely incidental; that oil could not be lifted
without liberating the gas, and that as the production of oil was the supreme
object of the operators, they could not be concerned with the gas. Only a
small po1iion of the gas produced was devoted to utilitarian purposes. Oil
wells and gas wells producing richly gas would sometimes catch fire and be
allowed to burn for weeks at a time. Great craters formed in p01iions of
Smackover field and raging infernos consumed billions of feet of gas,
creating conflagrations that could be seen for fifty miles." 54
b. Act l 66 of l 917
Arkansas attempts to conserve oil and gas by legislation began early and dealt with
distinct problems of waste. The first legislative act was Act 166, Session Acts of 1917,55
that dealt with shallow gas production in the early gas fields in Sebastian County. The Act
required, inter alia, the confinement of water formations in the drilling of the wells to
avoid flooding the productive reservoir, 56 mandated plugging of abandoned oil and gas
wells,57 prohibi ted the long term venting of gas 58 , and limited the production of gas to not
in excess of 20% 59 of the open hole capacity of the well. The latter requirement was
likely to prevent loss of "back pressure" to prevent water encroaclunent on the prod ucing
formation from underlying formations of water. 60 The Act was to be enforced by an
Inspector of Gas, 61 appointed by the Governor, and assessment of fines for violations. 62
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c. Act 664 of 1923
The discovery of the Smackover oil field in 1922 led to a 1923 statute that
expanded the prohibition on waste 63 Al though entitled an "Act to conserve crude oil or
petroleum and natural gas," the emphasis on the prevention of waste was on gas
production. The act mandated that all pipeline companies, gas distributors, oil and gas
drilling and producing operators prevent all waste of oil and gas in their respecti ve
operations, including leakage and spillage from thei r equipment and facil ities, as well as
production in "any manner or under any such conditions as to constitute waste." 64 Such
waste was specifically defined as the emitting or flaring of natural gas, drowni ng a
commercial gas stratum wi th water, underground waste, and the wasteful utilization of
gas.65 The Act expressly prohibit gas in the reservoir from being used to flow the oil to
the surface when the gas could be "separated" from the oil production. 66 Other than
surface waste, the only waste of oil forbidden was underground waste which was not
specifically defined. In lieu of a market demand proration scheme for gas, the act
provided that when the reservoir production exceeded the market demand, a producer
could only take his proportionate share of the natural flow that could be marketed without
waste. 67 The Act also imposed a "a common purchaser and ratable take" scheme for the
purchase of gas production. 68
Conspicuously absent from the Act was the lack of regulation on oil production. The
act imposed no well-spacing, unitization, market demand prorationing or ratable take
obl igations on oil production. The Smackover Field was developed under the rule of
capture with the physical and economic waste associated with its legions of unnecessary
wells. The Act did vest the Arkansas Railroad Commission, succeeded by the Board of
Conservation (Board) in 1927, 69 with the authority to administer the Act and promulgate
all necessary rules and regulations to conserve oil or gas including the imposition of
further control over the production of oil or gas. 70 Arguably, the Arkansas Railroad
Commission had the authority to implement controls on production by rule making. No
such administrative regulations were enacted.
Smackover Field appears to be comprised of associated oil and gas reservoirs.
Gas was a waste product in 1923, without a market, and wanton venting or flaring of the
gas was the rule of the day. In addition to the gas bei ng wasted, dissipation of the
reservoir pressure by venting and flaring the gas was causing underground waste of oil.
The Board had the authority to enforce the Act's prohibitions against venting or flaring
gas. However, enforcing the Act's prohibition of venting and flaring gas would have
limited, if not prohibited oil production, the only play in the field. Needless to say, the
Act was never enforced. The explanation offered for the lack of enforcement is that the
State legislature levied a severance tax of 2 Yi of market value on oil and gas a month
before the enactment of the Conservation measure. 71 Enforcing the Act to prevent the
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waste of gas would have greatly reduced the flush oil production, decreasing the oil
severance revenues that were filling the coffers of the state's treasury, as well as the
operators.72
d. Act 234 of 1933
The state legislature primarily re-enacted the substantive provisions of the 1923
Conservation Act as Act 234 of 1933. 73 The Arkansas Board of Conservation was
created to administer the Act. The five (5) member Board were to be "experienced in and
having a fair knowledge of the oil and gas industry." 74 The waste of oil and gas as
defined and proscribed in the 1933 Act were identical to the provisions of the 1923 Act. 75
The common purchaser and ratable take and market demand proration provisions for gas
were also identical. 76 The Board of Conservation was authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations. 77 Ominously, however, the Board 's authority to impose further
administrati ve control over oil and gas production by rule making was excluded by the
1933 Act.
1. The Rodessa Field

1937 was a lamentable year for Act 234 and the Board of Conservation. The
Rodessa Field, discovered in 1935, spanned from Jefferson, Texas to Caddo Parish in
Louisiana, was extended into south Miller County, Arkansas by a discovery well in June
of 1937. The Rodessa Field was the most impotiant oil and gas discovery in Arkansas
since 1925. The discovery well indicated that the reservoir had a large gas cap and to
attain optimum recovery from the reservoir production of gas should be minimized. 78 Both
Louisiana and Texas regulated the production in their respective share of the tri state
field by well-spacing and prorationing regulations. The Board of Conservation was
largely dormant in Arkansas at the time of the Rodessa Field discovery because of the
lack of funding.79 The Board only had two employees, a field man and a stenographer. 80
There was no geologist or petroleum engineer employed by the Board. The agency was
not adequately staffed or funded to deal with the challenge of the Rodessa Field.
Moreover, Act 234 was inadequate to address the issues of waste and the protection of
correlative rights. 81 Nevertheless, with 10 wells having been completed in the field, the
Board issued an Order that dictated a scheme of well spacing and prorationing for the
Arkansas field consistent with the Texas and Louisiana regulations. 82 A hue and cry
against the Order was raised by furious landowners, operators and royalty owners and the
local press. Mass meeti ngs of protests were held and the governor was implored to
intervene and seek the lifting of the Order by the Board. 83 Three days before the Order
was to be effective, it was enjoined by a Miller County court in an action brought by a
local operator. One argument advanced by the operator before the local cowi was that
market demand prorationing had nothing to do with physical waste and everything to do
with price fixing. 84
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The state court injunction allowed continuation of the unrestrained production that
lasted for approximately one year. Duri ng that period the Rodessa Field in Arkansas lost
76% of its reservoir pressure while Louisiana and Texas lost 34% and I 8% of their
respective reservoi r pressure. 85 The loss of pressure was a result of excessive and non
ratable flow rates from the wells and the dense well-spacing. 86 It is estimated in I 938 that
the Arkansas portion of the field prod uced $7 million in oil but that the underground
waste caused by the unregulated prod uction resu lted in $25 million in non
recoverable reserves bei ng left behi nd. 87 Approximatel y 1300 acres of the
estimated 3500 acre fiel d had been developed by 98 wells at the end of the year of
u nregulated production. 88 The dissipation of the reservoir pressure by the closely
spaced wells and open flow prod uction made it uneconomical to developed the
remai nder of the acreage. 89

2. The Schuler Field
The contrast between the physical waste in the Arkansas section of the tri
state field resu lting from unregulated prod uction and the exemplary performance
from the regulation prod uction in Louisiana and Texas made a compelli ng case for
regulated production. The lesson was not lost on the interested paiiies i n the
Schuler Field that was discovered in July of 1937. Royalty owners, operators and
landowners from the Schuler Field area petitioned the Board of Conservation for a
heari ng on the problems of uncontrolled prod uction. 90 Because the Board was
without jurisdiction to enforce well-spaci ng and its authority to Order
prorationi ng questionable due to the Miller County injunction, and it was withou t
funds or petroleum engineers, the Schuler Field group agreed to provide funds to
hire the necessary personnel so that regulations for the field could be promulgated
and implemented by the Board.91 The group volu ntari ly agreed to abide by the
Board 's rules and regulations. The arrangement was to last until the Board of
Conservation asked to resume state regulation. The Board agreed to the
arrangement and the funds were advanced, engineers hired, and the Board held a
heari ng and issued well-spaci ng and prorationi ng regulations for the Schuler
Field. 92 The aJTangement proved to be successfu l and the Schuler field avoided
much of the tragedy that plagued the Arkansas Rodessa Field.
The volu ntary scheme of controlled product ion, with the Board of
Conservation as the administrator for the Schuler Field, was a stopgap measure
designed to avoid irreparable physical waste and violation of correlative rights in
the Schuler Field to give the state time to enact an adequate and comprehensive
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Conservation Act. During the i nterval a committee of legislators, oil and gas
operators and members of the Board of Conservation drafted a proposed Act to
submit to the legislature as a replacement to Act 234. 93 O.C. Bailey, the Chairman
of the Board of Conservation, and the first Chairman of the AOGC, reported the
drafting committee adopted the 'best features' of the conservation laws of other
states.94 Chairman Bai ley attended the initial meetings of the IOGC and was likley
knowledgeable of the "model acts" the IOGC had been drafti ng since the early
l 930's. Bailey opined that the drafting committee's Act, destined to be enacted as
Act I 05 of 1939, was the "most modern and comprehensi ve statute adopted by any
up to that time."95
Bail ey's view was not universall y accepted. It has been recorded that the
i nteri m between the implementation of the voluntary conservation scheme in the
Schuler field and the passage of Act l 05, was a period of "vil i fication,
misunderstandi ng, scurrilous newspaper editorials, and vitrolic public expression
of opinion" particularly on prorationi ng. 96 The adoption of well-spaci ng, forced
integration, and proration of prod uction that ended unregulated production of oil
and gas under the rule of capture did not happen without a struggle.

V.

The Arkansas Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1939 (Act 105 of 1939)

The 1923 Conservation Act was doomed as an effective oil and gas
conservation Act. The lack of comprehensive coverage, particularly the absence
of an oil pro-rationi ng, a common purchaser or ratable take, and well-spaci ng to
limit the density of drilling, left the industry as it had come into bei ng,
unregulated and vul nerable to waste and instabil ity. The Arkansas Oil and Gas
Conservation Act, Act I 05 of 1939, was enacted in 1939 to correct the
deficiencies of the prior Act and to provide a comprehensive regulatory scheme to
prevent waste and protect correlati ve rights. 97 The Act is representati ve of the
numerous state oil and gas conservation statutes enacted in the 1930s to remedy
the evils associated with common pool exploitation by modi fying the rule of
captu re and regulati ng the drilling of production of oil and gas.
The Act expressl y provi des that all common sources of supply for oil and
gas discovered after J anuary I , 193 7 shall be controlled and regulated by Act
105. 98 Al though the Act was enacted on February 20, 1939, the l egislatu re
specificall y make the statute retroact ive to January I , 1937. The obvious
reason for the legisl ature 's maki ng the Act effect ive as to common sources of
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suppl y discovered after 1937 is tha t the Board of Conservat ion had regu l ated or
attempted to regu late the Rodessa and Schu l er fields that had been d iscovered
before that date. Su rel y, a majo ri ty of the i nterests in the Schu ler field, some of
whom had pa rticipated in the draft i ng of the Act, wanted the protection of Act
I 05. In early days of the Act, the number of wells in the u ncontrolled fields
exceeded the nu mber of wells in the control l ed fields. 99 U ncontrolled
prod uctio n still exists in Arkansas.

a. The Arkansa s Oil and Gas Commission
The Act established the AOGC to admi nister the prod u ction and
conservat ion sect ions of the Act. 1 00 The AOGC is authorized to promulgate
ru les and regulations to ensu re the proper administrati on and enforcement of
1 01
The Act, as well as the AOGC 's ru les and regu l ati ons, is enforced
the Act.
by a fine of no more than $2,500 for vi ol ation as well as each day of
vi ol ati on. 1 02 Prod ucti on in violation of t he Act known as illegal oil , gas or
prod uct is sanctioned 1 03 and subsequent dealing, such as selling, pu rchasi ng, or
refi ning of i llegal oil, gas or prod uct is prohi bited. 104 The administration and
enforcement of the Act, includi ng all AOGC 's activities, is funded exclusi vel y
by a tax on oil and gas prod uct ion. 1 05

b. Prevention of Waste and Protection of Correlative Rights
The pu rpose of the Act is to prevent waste and protect correlat i ve
rights. 106 The common occurrences of physical waste of oil and gas associated
with the rule of capture are proscribed by the Act. The following are expressly
prohibited: ( I ) "inefficient, excessi ve, or improper use" of reservoi r energy, and
the locati ng, spacing, dri lling, equippi ng, operati ng or prod uci ng of any oil or gas
well or wells in a manner which results in less than ulti mate recovery; 1 07
(2)"inefficient storing of oil and the locating, spacing, dri lling, equipping,
operati ng, or prod ucing of any oil or gas well" that red uces surface loss or
destruction of oil or gas usage; 1 08 (3) abuse of correlati ve rights due to
nonu niform, disproportionate, and unrata ble withdrawals causing u ndue drainage
between tracts; 1 09(4)"producing oil or gas in such [a] manner [causing]
unnecessary water channeling or coning;" 1 1 0 (5) operating wells with inefficient
111
oil-gas ratios; (6) "drowning with water. ..any stratum capable of prod uci ng oil
1 12
or gas (7) penni tting "the escape into the open air of gas in excess of the amount
that is necessary for the efficient drill ing or operation of a well produci ng both oil
and gas;" 1 13and permitti ng gas to escape from a well prod uci ng gas. 1 14 Any act or
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practice that resul ts in u ndergrou nd waste is proscri bed even if not specificall y
defined by the Act. 1 15

c. Proration and Ratable Take
Prorationi ng for oil, as well as gas, or both, was authorized in Act. 1 16
Unlike the predecessor act of 1933 that limited the amount of gas prod uction
from gas wells when the supply of gas exceeded market demand, MER
prorationi ng was authorized by the Act. The language of the Act simply
authorizes the Commission to prorate prod uction of oil or gas, or both, from any
field or pool to prevent waste. 1 1 7 Omitted from the statute is the language usabl y
contained in market demand proration acts that expands the definition of waste to
incl ude production "in excess of transportat ion or market faci lities or reasonable
market demand." 1 18 The legislatu re bailed out on market demand prorationi ng.
Assumabl y, the critics of market demand prorationi ng from the Rodessa and
Schuler field battles killed a market demand proration scheme in Act I 05.
However, well allowables were likel y not exclusi vely assigned solely on
the pri nciples of efficient rate of production of MER. The prod uction from the
u ncontrolled fields was the obstacle. The Act requi red the AOGC to determine
the aggregate amount of the statewide production from the controlled reservoirs
and fields by MER prorationi ng. 1 1 9 The Act did not specify how the aggregate
amou nt of prod uction from the uncontrolled fields was to be determi ned but it
was to be calculated. Once the statewide total of oil or gas production was
establ ished, that amount was to be allocated between the controlled and
uncontrolled reservoi rs on a "reasonable basis." 120 "Small wells" in the
uncontrolled reservoi rs were to be given a "sufficient allowable", i.e., a "living
allowable," that would not accelerate or encourage thei r premature
abandonment. 1 21
The question is fairly presented as to whether the AOGC used market
demand prorationing to determi ne the aggregate statewide production from both
the controlled and uncontrolled fields. As to the controlled prod uction, they
would only l imit a well 's allowable if the market demand allocation was below its
MER allocation. Although Arkansas is not usually l isted as one of the market
demand proration states, 122 there is some hint that the AOGC might have engaged
in the practice. The suspicions surrou nds Order No. 38-39 1 23 issued by the
AOGC on August 16, 1939, that suspended the pendi ng schedule of prod uction
allowables and "shut down" all produci ng wells in the controlled fields. The
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Emergency Order was ostensi bly to determi ne i f ph ysical waste was occu rring in
the fields and if some well were inca pable of maki ng their well allowables. The
Order did recite that the AOGC had been previ ously peti tioned to refrai n from
red ucing allowables to retard the decl i ne in reservoi r pressure because the
industry was in a period of "high oil consumption." 124 Moreover, at a subsequent
heari ng to be held on the emergency Order the AOGC was to hear evidence on
the "bona fide ratable outlet" for oil and gas in the various controlled fields for
the forthcomi ng months. The val idity of the emergency Order was ul timately
upheld by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Lion Oil Refini ng Co. v. Bailey' 25 that
held that authority of the Commission to issue emergency orders without first
havi ng a heari ng did not vi olate the due process clauses of the State or Federal
Constitutions. Although the case never mentioned market demand prorationi ng
or the AOGC 's general authority to prevent waste, it has been cited for the
proposi tion that a conservation agency has the implied right to engage in market
demand prorationi ng pursuant to its general statutory authori ty to prevent
waste. 1 26
The traditional common purchaser or ratable take statutes that complement
prorat ioning statutes in many conservation acts to ensure that non-uniform rates
of prod uction by wells in the common source of supply to prevent waste and
protect correlati ve rights is absent from Act 105. Instead, Act I 05 defi nes waste
to include the "abuse of correlati ve ri ghts of each owner of oil and gas in a
common reservoir due to nonuniform, disprop01iionate, and unratable
withdrawals causing und ue drainage between tracts of land." 127 Consequently,
the AOGC can make rules and regulations to prevent the waste or violation of
correlative rights by non-uniform withd rawals but it is not authorized to compel
purchasers to take and purchase ratabl y from all wells in the common source of
supply. The AOGC 's authority to compel the pu rchaser to take ratably is
dou btful. 128

d. Well Spacing and Limiting the Density of Drilling: The Drilling
Unit and its Subsequent Evolution
The most significant and far-reachi ng addition to the conservation of oil and
gas made by the new Act is its well-spaci ng scheme. To avoid excess density of
drilling, with its u nnecessary and uneconomical wells 129 the Act established
"drilling units" that permitted one wel l in the common source of supply for each
drilling u nit. 1 30 Drilli ng units were to be established by determini ng the
maxi mum area that one well would "efficiently and economically" drain based on
18

the geologic and and engi neeri ng characteristics of the reservoi r. The standard
of "efficient and economic" drainage applied in well spaci ng has often been
misunderstood. The element of "economic drainage" in the standard is to permit
adoption of wider spacing regulations, creating larger units, for deeper, more
costly wells to ensu re development of the reservoir. A field requi ring deep
expensi ve wells may not be economicall y feasible to develop on a tight spacing
pattern that employs smaller drilling u nits that permits more wells to be drilled in
the field. The accumulated cost of dri lling numerous expensi ve wells on smaller
drill ing u nits may ward off the investment required to develop the field.
Al though Act 105 employed the maxi m u m are of efficient and economic
drainage to determine the drilling unit size for optimum reservoi r development, it
prohi bited the AOGC from creating a drilling unit for oil larger than 40 acres. 1 l 1
Thus, the legislatu re was willi ng to modify the rule of captu re to alleviate the evils
of excess density of dri ll ing so long as the well-spaci ng pattern for oil was no
grreater than 40 acres regardless of whether the efficient and economic
drainage test dictated a wider well-spaci ng pattern. The 40 acre u nit size
limitation as a ceiling on well density lasted u ntil it was repealed in 1951 . 1 32
The early drill ing units established by the AOGC adopted the Texas
method of well spacing by enforcing the prescribed density pattern by limiting the
distance that the operator could drill a well from existing wells or prope1iy
boundary lines. 1 ll F01iunatel y, the AOGC very early adopted the practice of
fashioning drilling units as squares and rectangles that correspond to the
rectangular system oflegal descriptions of land that applies exclusively in
Arkansas. Thus, a 640-acre spacing involves drilling u nits composed of
governmental sections, 160-acre spacing involves drill ing uni ts composed of
quaiier sections, 80-acre spacing invol ves drilling units based on half-quaiier
sections, 40-acre spacing involves drill ing units composed of quarter-quarter
sections, and 10-acre spacing involves quarter-quarter-quarter sections. 1 34 The
Act requi red the well to be located at the center of the drilling unit unless
geologic disadvantage or topographical conditions, includi ng surface
improvements, prevented dri ll ing at that location. ll 5 Later, the AOGC permi tted
dri lling anywhere withi n the uni t not prohibited by an external set back location
136
restriction.
In the event that surface topographical featu res prohibited drilling
at a prescribed location, an exception location that permitted an off-pattern well
cou ld be authorized with a penal ty in the form of a lower well allowable to avoid
any drainage attributed to the off-pattern wel l. 137
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The well-spaci ng scheme of the 1939 Act also protects the correlat ive
rights of the mineral owners who prod uce form the dri lling u nits that overlay the
reservoi r. The Act specificall y incorporates the "just and equitable share"
pri nciple. 138 Subject to reasonable measu res to prevent waste, the producer's just
and equitable share of the reservoi r is the amou nt of prod uction "which is
substantially in the proportion that the quantity of recovera ble oil and gas in the
developed area of the prod ucers tract in the pool bears to the recoverable oil and
gas in the total developed area of the pool, in so far as that amount can be
practicall y ascertained." 139 The correlative rights of the prod ucer in the drill ing
uni t is further protected in that the AOGC cannot requ ire the prod ucer to drill
unnecessary wells to recover his just and equitable share. 140 More importantly, the
AOGC must protect the drilling unit from net uncompensated drainage unless
offset protection wells, in add iti on to the drilli ng unit well, have been dri lled on
the u nit to protect against drainage. 141
For many years, the drilling units established by the AOGC were
"production units." Before the AOGC had jurisdiction to establish drilling units a common source of supply - a reservoir had to be discovered. The AOGC
required a pa1iy drilling a discovery well in the reservoi r to appear before the
agency and seek fiel d rules, which established drilling units, withi n six months of
completion of the discovery well or before three prod uci ng wells were drilled in
the reservoi r, whichever occurred first. 142 The "field rules" establ i sh a drilli ng
uni t or u ni ts for the applicants' completed well or wells and also for direct and
offsets to the newly established producti ve drilling u nits. The practice is a
modified well-by-well approach to establishi ng drilling u nits.
Exploratory drilling units were authorized by legislative amendment to the
Act in 1985. 143 An exploratory drilling unit must be comprised of a governmental
section or its equivalent and must be prospecti ve of oil or gas, or both. 144 When
50% of working interest owners or u nleased mineral owners from the proposed
unit area agree to pool, the AOGC has authority to integrate the remaini ng non
consenting worki ng interest owners or u nleased mineral owners. 145 The
established exploratory drilling uni t, along with the right of forced integration, is
limited to a period of one year from the date of the order, or alternati vely, one
year from the cessation of u nit drilling or prod uction from operations. 146 The
pri mary benefit of the add iti on of the exploratory drill ing uni t is that it provided
the remedy of forced integration to assist in the leasing of exploratory projects.
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From 1939 to the advent of the Fayettevi lle Shale Play in 2004, the oil and
gas prod uction regulated by the Act and the AOGC was from conventional
reservoi rs. The administration of the Act by the AOGC duri ng this lengthy
period refl ects Justice Hol me's admonition that "the l i fe of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience." 147 Moreover, the AOGC's practices in establishi ng
dril ling units is a classic exampl e of the diversity that exists in state regulation of
oil and gas prod uction u nder conservation acts. 148 The Arkansas well-spaci ng
scheme is sui generis, unique in the oil and gas regulatory world. The rationale
u nderl ying the Arkansas experience i n administeri ng the Act 's well-spacing
scheme, harki ng back to the political struggle to adopt the Act and subve1i the
common law rul e of capture, was expressed by the aphorism "one cup, one
straw." 149 This has sometimes been expressed as the u nwritten "Rule of One." 1 50
Fundamental fairness, as well as equal opportu nity, dictated that each drilling uni t
is only entitled to one well in the reservoi r. Accompanyi ng the one cup, one
straw proposition was the view that i f a prod ucer shouldered the risk and paid for
its share of the cost of a prod ucing well, the AOGC was not goi ng to meddle with
the configuration of the drilling unit by deleting a tract from the uni t or otherwise
diluting the ownership interest. This proposition was known in Arkansas as the
pri nciple of "vested rights." 1 51 Strict adherence to the Rule of One also obviated
the need to deal with vested rights issues resul ting from either downsizing or re
forming established and developed drilling units.
The AOGC also adhered to the rectangles and squares on the surface of the earth
that corresponded with the rectangular survey system of legal descriptions to
draw the drilling units. 1 52 The AOGC eschewed drawing geologic u nits whose
surface u nit boundaries corresponded with the boundaries of the subsurface
reservoi r. 1 53 The eight-inch well bores of the ve1iical produci ng wells in the
reservoir provided insufficient direct evidence of the porosity, permeability, and
size of the prod ucti ve sand to delineate with confidence the subsurface
boundaries of the reservoi r. Moreover, when the field rules for the reservoi r were
establ ished, there were too few prod uci ng wells in the reservoi r to provide the
well control necessary for the formation of geologic units. Not only would the
AOGC not fashion geologic units, it would also not gerrymander the
configuration of the drilling units on the surface i n an attempt more closely to
approxi mate the geographic confines of the sub-surface reservoi r. The AOGC
would not cross section lines or quarter section lines in the configuration of the
drilling units. The objective was uni form-sized drilling u ni ts, fo1iuitously
arranged on the basis of the rectangular survey system of legal descriptions, in an
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orderly pattern that spanned the developed field and avoided the presence of
"windows." 1 54
In the early days of the Act, the non-associated gas fields of the Arkoma
Basi n in north Arkansas were developed on 640 acre drilling u nits. 1 55 The 640acre drilling u nits were based on the AOGC's determi nation that 640 acres was
the area that one well would economically and efficientl y drai n. Over the cou rse
of time, 640-acre drilling units, based on governmental sections, became the norm
for gas drilling u nits in north Arkansas. As older fields matured and greater
knowledge of the geology of the gas fields accumulated, 1 56 doubts existed as to
whether one-u nit well was efficientl y and economical ly draining the u nits. 1 57
Nevertheless, the Rule of One reigned supreme in Arkansas and increased density
of drilling; permitting "infi ll" drilling in the large units was not an option.
Evidence that the existing unit well was not economicall y and efficientl y drai ni ng
the drilling u nit would not elicit an additional u nit well from the AOGC. An
additional well in a drilling unit would be authorized only if the appl icant could
prove that the second well would prod uce a reservoi r separate and distinct from
the reservoir of the unit wel l. 1 58 Unl ike Oklahoma, there is no case law or statute
in Arkansas that permi tted modification of an AOGC order establishi ng drilling
units due to the subsequent acquisition of geological data that signaled a change
of cond ition in the reservoi r. 1 59
The inabi lity to drill infi ll wells to recover gas not bei ng drained by the unit
and problems in establishing separation of reservoirs, when reservoi rs were
sometimes vertically stacked and underlay a 640-acre drill ing uni t, made a
mockery of the Rule of One's well-spaci ng regulations. 1 6 ° Consequentl y, in 2003,
the legislature amended the well-spacing regulations. 1 61 The amendment created
a statutory presu mption in favor of a 640-acre u nit composed of a governmental
section, though it permitted the AOGC to establish a larger or smaller unit. The
AOGC is specifically authorized to permit additional wells in the u nit and
regulate the spacing between the multipl e-unit wells. 1 62 Deleted from the Act is
the requi rement, u niversally recognized by oil and gas conservation lawyers and
academicians, that drilling units be established on the basis of the maximu m area
. that one well would efficiently and economicall y drain. Statutory guidance to the
AOGC on the parameters to be used in drawi ng dri ll ing uni ts no longer appears in
the Act. One may infer that the legislature, adopti ng the norm of the 640-acre
square mile unit as the presumpti ve standard, intended by implication for the
AOGC to apply a standard of "reasonableness" in fashioni ng drilling u nits under
the amended Act.
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Regard less of the theory that underl ies the presumption of a 640-acre, or square
mile, statutory unit, the practice before the AOGC on well spacing in the north
Arkansas gas fields had radically changed. As opposed to heari ng evidence on
the acreage that a single well would economicall y and efficiently drain, the
AOGC hears evidence on the "most effective and efficient manner of locati ng
multiple wells for the effective, but cost efficient, removal of the maximum
amou nt of oil and gas from a square mile u nit." 1 63 The emphasis is on economic
efficiency based on the geologic characteristics of the reservoi r. One may argue
that economic efficiency is not foreign to the tradi tional formula of maxi mu m
area of economic and efficient drainage, and, thus, the change in the standard in
Arkansas is not necessaril y profou nd. Whatever one think of the dearth of the
statutory standards for delineati ng drilling units, it is difficult to argue that the
amendment is not an improvement over the Rule of One.
The AOGC draws perspecti ve drilli ng u nits for the Fayettevi lle Shale
and other unconventi onal gas reservoi rs i n Arkansas. Each governmental
section i n each county in which the Fayettevi lle is know n or thought to exist is
covered on a cou nty-by-cou nty basis. i c,4 The drilli ng u ni ts in the cou nti es are
l abel ed as either "exploratory drilli ng u nits" or "established drilling u nits," the
latter bei ng prod uction u ni ts. Once a prod ucing well has been completed on
an expl oratory u nit, that u nit, and the offset u ni ts conti guous to it, become
prod ucti on u nits. 165
Sixteen vertical or hori zon tal wells, or a combination thereof, may be
drilled in an expl oratory dri lling u nit. 166 For vertical wells, that amou nts to a
forty-acre spacing pattern. For horizontal wells, even though sixteen is
permi tted , the external and internal u nit well-locati on restricti ons have the
potential to allow six to eight horizontal wells in the u nit. The in ternal well
l ocation restri ction requi res multipl e wells in the u nit to be spaced 448 feet
apart with an a llowed 20% variance. 1 67 This restriction may be wai ved by
obtai ni ng wri tten consent from all u nit work ing interest owners. 168 The
external well-locati on restriction, desi gned to protect other dril ling u ni ts from
drainage, requi res all wells to be set back a d ista nce of 560 feet from any u nit
bou ndary l ine or any other drill i ng u n it 's well. 1 69 Exception locati on wells
may be granted by the AOGC for topographical or geologic advantage
reasons. 1 70 The 560-foot setback creates a buffer zone of 1 ,120 feet that
extends arou nd any drilling u nit.
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Horizontal wells are dri lled verticall y and then tu rn on a ti ght rad iu s
before proceed ing ho rizo n tall y through the gas-beari ng strata. The well bore
for a horizontal wel l is defi ned by the AOGC ru l es as the entire perforated
length of the l ateral section of the horizontal wel l. 1 71 Consequ ently, based on
that definition, a horizonta l wel l invol ves a long narrow cylinder of a
prod uci ng reservoi r. The cyli nders may be arranged in such a fashion to
achieve effecti ve and cost-efficient drainage of the reservoi r. 172
The AOGC permi ts horizontal wells to extend into more than one dril ling
u nit when the majori ty in interest of worki ng interest owners seeks
authorization from the Commissi on and vol u ntari ly agrees to t he allocation of
costs and the proceeds form prod ucti on. 173 Ad ministrati ve approval of the
"cross u ni t" well by the Di rector of the AOGC, which avoi ds a heari ng and a
decision by the Commissi on, is authorized i f the affected dri lling u nits have
been previ ously integrated . 174 The costs and proceeds of prod ucti on for the
"cross u ni t" well are allocated by dra wing a "cyl indri cal u ni t" around the
perforated well bore. The costs and proceed s shared between each
pa rticipati ng drill ing uni t are based on the proportion of the cyl ind ri cal u nit (the
calcu l ated area) that i s l ocated in each such dri ll ing u nit. 175 The cylindrical u nit
is drawn by divi d ing a circle with a rad i u s of 560 feet at both the
begi n ning poi nt and the end ing poi nt of the perforated lateral well bore and
inserti ng a rectangle 560 feet in wi dth on both sides of the perforated
horizontal lateral. 176 It should be noted that the cyli ndrical u nit is not a formal
"dri ll ing u nit" u nder the Arkansas well-spaci ng regime, bu t is merel y a basis
for allocati ng costs and proceeds of prod ucti on from cross u nit wells.
Permi tting horizontal wells to extend into, or encroach upon, adjoi ni ng
drilling u nits faci litates the prod uction of gas situated in the 1 120-foot buffer
zone that are desi gned to protect against drainage and are situated between the
prod ucti ve areas of the drilling u nits. Otherwise, the gas wou ld be stranded
and opti mu m devel opment of the reservoi r would be precluded.
e. Forced Integration
Compulsi on by the state to achieve pooli ng when the parties fail ed to
volu ntaril y pool was a controversi al matter in 1939. The state's medd ling with
property ri ghts to the extent that it cou ld compel a mi neral owner to parti cipate
in a drilling vent ure, committi ng its share of the minerals in the reservoi r to the
project and imposi ng recovery of the prorata share of costs, in the absence of
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consent, was vi ewed with much skept i cism. The state of Texas, always the
largest oil and gas prod ucer in the l ower 48, didn 't enact a compu lsory pooli ng
statute u nt i l 1965. 1 77 Ka nsas doesn 't yet have such a statute. N everthel ess, the
inabi lity of worki ng interest owners to force i ntegrate pro vi ded no n-co nsent i ng
part ies u ndue l everage to exact u nfai r terms in the negot iat i on of t he vol u ntary
pool i ng agreemen t. Moreover, in t he absence of forced integrat ion, the refu sal
to vol u ntari ly pool by i ntra nsi gent non-consent i ng wo rki ng interest owner or
u nl eased mi neral owners coul d bar development of society 's val uabl e nat u ral
resou rces.
Arkansas was progressi ve in adopti ng forced integra tion in the 1939 Act.
Reciti ng the policy of preventi ng waste and avoi ding the dri lling of
u n necessary wells, the Act provi ded that when work i ng interest owners or
u nleased mineral owners i n two or more separately owned t racts located with in
a drilling u nit fail to vol u n ta ri ly pool, the AOGC shall integrate thei r interest so
that the dri ll ing u nit can be devel oped. 1 7 s The terms of the ma ndated
integrat ion must be just and reasona ble, provi de each integrated party the
opportun ity to recover their fair share of the reservoi r wi t hout u n necessary
expense and avoid net u ncompensated drainage. 179
Despite the spirit of enl ightenment that incl uded forced integration in the
1 939 Act, the system impl emented by the statute was flawed. The party who
integrated the non-consent ing in terest to dri ll the u nit well recovered the
i ntegrated party 's share of the devel opment costs (drill ing, completi ng and
operating costs) from the integrated party 's share of the u nit prod uctio n. 1 so
Wit h the exception of permitti ng the developi ng mi neral owner to recover a
reasonable charge for supervision from t he integrated party, the scheme is
identi cal to the accou nt ing applied to the devel oping and non-consent i ng co
tenants under the Statute of Anne. 1 s 1 The integrati ng party fronts the integrated
pa rty 's share of the development costs and only recovers those costs from the
latter 's share of prod uctio n. In the event the well is a dry hol e or a marginal
well that never pays out, the integrat ing party bears the risk of loss on the
carried interest 's share of the well costs. The integrated party is a "carried
interest" who gets a free ride down the wel l bore. The integrat i ng pa rty is not
compensated for assu ming the risk of l oss.

It was u nsound to apply the Statute of An ne standard of accou nti ng

applicable to developi ng and non-co nsenti ng co-tena nts to forced integrat ion
u nder the Conservati on Act. Placi ng the risk of loss for devel opment on the
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integrati ng party provided no incenti ve for the no n-co nsen t ing work ing interest
owner or u n l eased m i neral owner to vol u n ta ril y pool pu rsua n t to a pl an of
devel opment that requi red pa yi ng their proportio nate share of the costs of
development and pa rtici pati ng in the risk. Refusi ng to pool and goi ng forced
integrati on, avoi d ing the loss of in vestment on the dry hol e or u nprofita bl e
well, and bei ng carried on a profita bl e prod u cing wel l by I 00% of the share of
the costs to be recovered from prod ucti on, wasn 't a bad deal.
The l egislatu re made sweeping changes to forced integration i n I 963. 182
Overall , the free ride down the well for the carried interest was bu rdened wi th a
risk factor penal ty to compensate the parti cipati ng interests for beari ng the risk
of loss. A choice wi th optio ns was provi ded for the integrated parties. The
u nleased mi neral owners who elected the carri ed interest status were accorded a
statu tory 1/8 royal ty du ri ng the pay out period.
Forced Integration in Arka nsas today, reflecti ng the 1963 Amend men t,
can be simpl y descri bed. If the parties do not agree to pool volu ntari ly, the
AOGC, u pon the application of any mi neral owner or oil and gas J essee, is
requi red to force i ntegrate all tracts and interests for u n it devel opment. 1 83 The
integrati on order authorizes the drilling, completion, equ ippi ng and operation
of the well on the u nit 1 84 and designates the operator of the wel l. 1 85
The u nleased mineral owner has choices under the integrati on order. 1 86
She may elect to be "leased" in which she recei ves a competi tive royal ty, but
not less than a I /8th share, pl u s a bonus based on a "reasonable considerati on"
to be determi ned by the AOGC. 1 87 Alternati vel y, she may elect to participate in
the well, payi ng her proportionate share of the well costs and taki ng her
proportionate share of revenues attributa ble to her proportionate share of the
prod ucti on. 1 88 Havi ng paid her well costs up front, she takes her share of the
risk by parti cipati ng in the wel l. Another option is to go "non-consent" and be
"carried" by the participati ng owners who pay her share of the costs that are
subsequentl y, i f ever, recovered from her proportionate share of the revenues
attributa ble to her proportionate share of the prod uctio n. 1 89 Beca use the
partici pati n g owners are ta ki ng the risks of her share of the costs, the AOGC
will assess a "risk factor" penal ty against the carried interest based on the
geol ogi c risk. 1 90 The risk factor penal ty is usually 400% , bei ng her
proportionate share of the well costs times four (4) unless the prospect invol ves
extraord inary risk, which wi ll enhance the risk factor penalty. 191 Once payout
occu rs, the costs and risk-factor penalty are recovered from her share of the
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revenues, the non-co nsen t ing party reco vers her proportio nate sha re of the
1 92
prod uction.
Additionall y, the Act generousl y accords the non-consent ing
u n l eased mineral owner a l/8 royal ty share pend ing payou t. 1 93 Finall y, if the
u nl eased mi neral owner fails to make an electi on, she wi ll be deemed to be
leased. 1 94
The work i ng interest owner - the lessee who hol ds an oil and gas l ease
from a mi neral owner in the u n it - may partici pate in the dri ll ing of the well by
payi ng i ts share of the costs or by elect ing to go nonconsent. 1 95 If the worki ng
interest owner fails to specify i ts elect i on, it is deemed to ha ve elected to go
non-consent. 196
Once the AOGC promul gates an integrat ion order for a drilling u nit, all
operati ons on any part of the u nit, incl udi ng dri lling or operat ion of a well, are
deemed to be as i f the operat i ons were cond ucted on each separatel y owned
tract and interest i n the dri l ling u n it. 1 97 Li kewise, prod uct ion from any pa rt of
the dri lling u nit shall be deemed to be prod u cti on from every tract or interest
located in the u nit. 1 98 I n effect, the Act di ctates that the integrati on order has
the same effect on oil and gas lease terms, incl udi ng the secondary term
requ i rement of prod uct ion in the habend um clause, as to the vol u ntary pooli ng
of the lease interests. 1 99
f. Compulsor y Unitizita tion
Act 105 of 1939 did not provi de for compu lsory u nit izat ion. The
consequence of the omissi on of compulsory u ni t izat i on from the Conservation
Act was high lighted by subsequent events that occu rred in the McKa mi ke
Patton Field. The field, discovered in 1940 and covered 5000 acres,
experienced a preci pitous drop of reservoi r pressure in the late l 940's. Some
operators in the field promoted a vol u ntaril y u nitization plan for gas re
inject i on to enha nce the reservoi r pressure to avoi d substant ial l oss of oil and
gas reserves. Even though the plan of vol u ntary u nit ization was execu ted by
97% of the worki ng interest and 96% of the royalty owners, it failed due to the
hol d out of the minority interests. The AOGC, u pon pet ition by the proponents
of the vol u ntary plan, issued an Order requi ri ng u nitizat ion. The Arkansas
Supreme Court in Dodson v. Ark. Oil and Gas Com m 'n, 200 invalidated the
AOGC 's Order, hol ding that the agency had no ju risdi cti on to compel field
wide u nit izat ion.
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Shortly t hereafter, Act 134 of 195, 201 added a compulso ry u n itizati on
provision to the Conservation Act. The Act req u i res, inter alia , tha t the AOGC
mu st determi ne the foll owing criteri a is satisfied before issui ng an Order
requ iring compu lsory u nitizati on: 75% of the worki ng in terest and royalty and
overri ding royal ty interests from the total proposed u ni t area have executed the
agreement; 202 the uni t operation is reasona bl y necessary to prevent waste,
increase ul timate recovery of oil and gas, and protect the correlati ve ri ghts;2° 3
and that the val ue of the add itional oil to be recovered from the proposed u nit
operati on wi ll exceed the add iti onal cost incident to conducti ng the
operation. 204
The Act furt her requi res that the AOGC 's Order be "fair and
205
reasona bl e" and, inter alia , the parti cipation formu la m u st prov ide that each
separatel y owned tract wi ll recei ve its fair share of the prod uctio n of the u n i t
area. 206 The Act speci fically proh ibits the AOGC from adopting or
implemen ting an al l ocati on formu la that is not based on the relati ve
con tribu ti on, exclu sive of the prod uction equipment, made by each separately
owned tract. 207
A postscri pt on the Schu l er Field makes a salient poi nt on fieldwide
u nitization. The statement on the Shuler Fiel d is from Kramer and Marti n 's
excellent treatise on The Law of Pooli ng and Uni tizatio n: 208
A classi c exampl e of the success of pressu re mai ntenance by the
injecti on of gas and water was the Shuler Field i n Union County,
Arkansas. This field was discovered in 1937 and u nitized four
years later. Had the field been u nitized at the time of its discovery
or soon thereafter, the dri lling of seventy-one wells cou ld have
been avoided. Duri ng the four years of pri mary operation, bi llions
of cubi c feet of rich gas were vented into the air. Pri or to
u nitization, the field prod uced a total of approxi matel y 16 Y:,
mi l lion barrels of oil with a drop of reservoi r pressu re from 3,548
pou nds to 1 ,625 pou nds or a di fference of 1 ,923 pou nds. Thus,
duri ng the those four years, 55 percent of the vital reservoi r
pressure was expended in the production of 1 1 percent of the total
oil in pl ace.
Du ring the first eight years of operation u nder the u nitization plan, 30
milli on barrels of add itional oil was prod uced with a pressure drop of
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on ly 185 pou nds. U nder pri ma ry prod uction operati on the field would
have l ong since been exhau sted , w hereas, by l ate as 1954 it was still
prod uci ng wel l over 5,500 barrels of oil per day. Through January 1,
1953, the fiel d had prod uced over 7 1 mi l lion barrels of oil. The
estima ted recovery as a resu lt of u nitized operati ons is approxi matel y I 00
mi ll ion ba rrels of oil, a recovery to close to 90 percent of the oil i n place.
The u nitiza ti on of a field that shows promise for a pressu re mai ntenance
project shou ld be impl emented as early as possi ble after discovery to ma ximize
ulti mate recovery form the reservoi r. The sooner the beetler is the lesson to be
learned from the Shuler Fi eld.
Conclusion
Arkansas' modern Oil and Gas Conservati on Act, comprisi ng Act I 05
and its major amend ments, has been successfu l i n regu lati ng oi l and gas
prod uction to eliminate economic and ph ysical waste. Reservoi rs discovered
subseq u ent to Act I 05 have been controlled and well spacing and MER
prorati on ing have elimi na ted the excessive densi ty of dril ling and rates of
prod ucti on that occasioned so much economic and physi cal waste du ring the
era of u ncontroll ed prod uctio n. A fair and bal anced statutory remedy of forced
integratio n has bl u n ted the abi l ity of non-consen ti ng interests to impede the
dri lling of exploratory and development wells. Well spacing and forced
integration have provi ded the framework for the oil and gas dri ll ing tra nsaction
i n Arkansas. The established expl oratory u nit or dri ll ing u ni t has provided
certai nty as to the locatio n and geographic extent of the area of the prospect.
Force integration has established the relati ve rights of the worki ng interests and
mi neral and royal ty in terest withi n the u nit U nitized reservoi rs and fields are not
u ncom mon in South Arkansas, either as an early in the life of the field pressu re
mai ntenance projects or as belated secondary recovery operations.
The prod ucti ve life of the field or reservoi r is extended and recovery is
enhanced. Compulsory unitiza tion either created the u ni tized project or its
th reat facilitated its creati on by voluntary uni tization
The Conservation Act proved sufficiently flexible to accommodate state
regu lation of production from u ncon ventional reservoi rs in Arkansas. The
Act 's ample rule mak ing authority vested in the AOGC, which was exercised
wisel y by the agency, permi tted the imposi ti on of rules to govern the regu lation
of the development of the Fayetteville Shale deposi tion. The AOGC 's state
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wi de rules for Fa yettevi lle Shale development accom modated hori zon tal
drilli ng and hydraulic fractu ri ng (fracing) that proved necessary to
economicall y compl ete Fayettev i l le Shale wells. Approxi matel y 5000 pl u s
wells, mostl y hori zontal ,, have been completed and are prod uci ng in the B-43
area. As a consequence, Arka nsas is the 8 111 l argest prod ucer of natu ral gas i n
the U nited States. 209
So there i s much success to attribu te to Act I 05 and post-1 939 oil and
gas conservati on. However, the pre-1939 losses occasioned by waste still
casts a deep shadow over the ind ustry in Arka nsas. The Smackover Fiel d,
d iscovered in 1922, was Arka nsas ' "giant" oil and gas field , span ni ng in excess
of 25,000 acres. 21 0 At its peak year of prod ucti on, in 1925, it was the leading oil
prod uci ng field in the worl d. 21 1 The sheer amou nt of oil wasted, most bei ng
attributed to u ndergrou nd waste resul ting from depletion of gas pressu re, was
enormou s. O.C. Bai l ey, in 1938, opined that one bi ll ion barrels of recovera ble
reserves were l eft behi nd in the Smackover Field, as a consequence of waste. 212
Basically, the Smackover Field was ruined.
It is difficu lt to fault the pio neer opera tors in the early l 920's that were
committing the waste. They were ignorant as to associ ated oil and gas
reservoi r mechanics and the efficient rates of prod uction and pressu re
mai ntenance pri nciples that were pioneered by the earl y petrol eum engineers.
The truth of the matter is that Arka nsas ' misfort u ne with Smackover and the
smaller oil fields discovered i n the I 920's was based on fortu itous
circu mstances. The field was discovered prior to the development of effici ent
reservoi r ma nagement to avoi d u ndergrou nd waste by the science of petroleu m
engineeri ng. The Smackover Fi eld tu rned out to be the indu stry's lesson on
how not to do it for the bi g discoveri es of the late 1920's and earl y 1930's.

Consequentl y, in Arka nsas, the ubiqui tous language in the modern
parlance of oil and gas conservation," prevent waste and protect correl ative
rights", the cornerstone of Act 105, is not simpl y a reci tation of theory, it is our
experi ence. The loss in t he early 1920's of I bi llion barrels of oil prod ucti on to
the future economy of the State of A rkansas has not been a small price to pay.
The tragic legacy of the Smackover Fi eld is "indeli bly woven into the fabric of
conservati on and controlled prod uction history." 21 3
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